A Deadly Miniature Aerial Missile System launches munitions from a MARTAC T-38 Satan Ray unmanned floor automobile, connected to U.S. Naval Forces Central Command’s Process Power 59, throughout Train Digital Talon within the Arabian Gulf on October 23, 2023.{Photograph}: Chief Mass Communication Specialist Justin Stumberg/US NAVY
The Navy’s armed USV efforts seem to have culminated in Undertaking 33, a brand new initiative unveiled as a part of Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Lisa Franchetti’s 2024 Navigation Plan in September 2024 that focuses on, amongst different targets, “scal[ing] robotic and autonomous systems to integrate more platforms at speed” in an ostensible complement to the Pentagon’s bigger Replicator effort, designed to outfit American fleets with armed robotic boats forward of a possible future conflict with China.
“This Navigation Plan drives toward two strategic ends: readiness for the possibility of war with the People’s Republic of China by 2027 and enhancing the Navy’s long-term advantage,” as Franchetti wrote on the time. “We will work towards these ends through two mutually reinforcing ways: implementing Project 33 and expanding the Navy’s contribution to the Joint warfighting ecosystem … By 2027, we will integrate proven robotic and autonomous systems for routine use by the commanders who will employ them.”
The Protection Division appears assured that the Navy’s robotic push will assist put together the US navy for the opportunity of conflict with China, however some seasoned navy and protection observers have their misgivings. Van Riper factors to Marine Corps’ Power Design 2030, a reorganization of the service forward of a notional island-hopping battle in opposition to China within the Pacific, as proof that the Pentagon nonetheless hasn’t realized the precise classes from Millennium Problem 2002.
The Marine Corps “was known for being an air-ground combined arms rapid-response deployed around the world,” Van Riper tells WIRED. “Now it has divested itself of every element of combined arms or reduced it, getting rid of its armor, breaching vehicles, mine clearing, and assault bridging capabilities, cutting its infantry and aviation, all to buy missiles and go on the defense in the Pacific. The Marine Corps got rid of existing capabilities in favor of unproven or undelivered capabilities.”
Certainly, the US navy’s propensity to fixate on next-generation expertise like drone boats as a one-size-fits-all fight answer could obscure these tactical classes in mixed arms evident within the Ukrainian marketing campaign within the Purple Sea, Van Riper says.
“You shouldn’t take the use of drones in isolation with what Ukraine is doing,” Van Riper says. “We presented the Navy fleet [in Millennium Challenge 2002] with multiple challenges, which is really what combined arms is. What you’re doing is presenting the enemy with a dilemma: If he tries to protect himself against threat A, he’s vulnerable to threat B, and with threats C, D, and E, he’s unable to handle it. In Ukraine, boats plus missiles and aircraft are more difficult for the Russians to respond to.”
“I’m not sure the US military today is equipped to learn from those things,” he provides. “I’m depressed from the leadership on all levels, particularly the naval services.”
